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RECENT CASES
PiROPERTY-MoRTGAGE RECORDING STATuTEs-THE CASE OF THE IGNORED
STATurrE-The defendant, Thomas, won 35 acres of land on a one dol-
lar ticket in a lottery sponsored by the V.F.W. The plaintiff, Shuffield,
claimed that the property was subject to his mortgage which was
executed before the land was conveyed to Thomas. Thomas contended
that the mortgage was not valid against him because it was not re-
corded. Shuffield answered that the defendant was not a bona fide
purchaser because the lottery was entirely illegal as a violation of the
Arkansas Constitution.' Held: The plaintiff was entitled to a decree
establishing the priority of his unrecorded mortgage lien over the sub-
sequent lottery deed. The Court concluded that the winner of the
lottery could not be a bona fide purchaser for value since the lottery
constituted an illegal consideration for the transfer of the property.
Hence, the lottery winner's title could not prevail because the Arkansas
recording statute2 protects only a bona fide purchaser for value. Shuf-
field v. Raney, 287 S.W. 2d 588 (Ark. 1956).
This decision, as the dissent pointed out, is a departure from what
had been considered established law. Previously, the Arkansas Court,
in the application of the recording statutes, had drawn a distinction
between deeds and mortgages, 3 and had established that Arkansas
had a "race"4 statute governing mortgage recording and a "notice"5
statute for deeds.6 This distinction was based on the interpretation of
two recording statutes:
Ark. Stat. sec. 51-1002. Every mortgage... shall be a lien
on the mortgaged property from the time the same is filed in the
recorder's office for record, and not before. ....
Ark. Stat. see. 16-115. No deed, bond or instrument of
writing, for the conveyance of any real estate or by which the title
thereto may be affected in law or equity . . . shall be good or valid
against a subsequent purchaser of such real estate for a valuable con-
sideration without actual notice thereof; . . . unless such deed ...
shall be ified in the office of the clerk ...
IArt. 19, see. 14. "Lotteries prohibited. No lottery shall be authorized by
this state nor shall the sale of the lottery tickets be allowed."
2 Ar. Stats. sees. 16-110.
3DIU v. Snodgrass, 201 Ark. 748, 211 SW 2d 440 (1948) (dictum); Patton
on Titles, secs. 8, 9, 13 (1938).4 Race means: As between claimants, whoever records first wins and notice
is immaterial.5 Notice means: A purchaser can prevail over prior unrecorded instruments
only if he is a subsequent purchaser for value and is without actual notice of the
prior instrument.
6 Dodd v. Parker, 40 Ark. 536 (1883); Martin v. Ogden, 41 Ark. 186 (1883);
Simpson v. First National Bank of De Witt, 173 Ark. 284, 292 SW 138 (1927);
Polster v. Langley, 201 Ark. 396, 144 SW 2d 1063 (1940); Sims v. McFadden,
217 Ark. 810, 283 SW 2d 375 (1950).
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It is apparent, if the preceding statutes are read literally, that they
prescribe conflicting rules for determining priority of competing mort-
gages. The first statute is a "race" statute, giving priority to the one
who first records his mortgage regardless of the fact that he may have
notice of other unrecorded claims to the mortgaged property or that
he failed to give a valuable consideration. The second statute, apply-
ing to all instruments which may affect the title in law or equity,'
clearly establishes Arkansas as a "notice" jurisdiction which allows a
subsequent purchaser to prevail over a prior unrecorded mortgage
only if the purchaser is a bona fide purchaser for value. However, in
spite of this apparent conflict of the two statutes, the Court previously
had resolved the difficulty by refusing to apply the second statute to
mortgages.
The decision of the instant case, in applying the "notice" statute to
mortgages, reversed the established distinction between these two
statutes. The majority opinion accomplishes this without reference
to the many previous cases contra; and it fails to cite a single case to
support its decision to apply the "notice" statute to mortgage record-
ings. Since the majority places emphasis on the evils of lotteries and
their detriment to society, it might be concluded that the Court did
not specifically overrule the cases contras but instead formulated
"lottery law" which would have no application to title acquired by
means other than a lottery. The alternative conclusion is that Arkansas
is now a "notice" jurisdiction in regard to all conveyances of real estate
and Ark. Stat. sec. 51-1002 has been judicially repealed. Whatever the
conclusion, the legislature should clarify its recording statutes, making
clear under what theory the Arkansas conveyancing system is to
proceed.
The Arkansas case is interesting to Kentucky lawyers because
Kentucky has two statutes which are almost identical in content to the
Arkansas statutes. These statutes are:
Ky. Rev. Stat.* sec. 882.280. All bona fide deeds of trust or mort-
gages shall take effect in the order that they are legally acknowledged
or proved and lodged for record.
Ky. Rev. Stat. see. 882.270. No deed or deed of trust or mortgage
conveying a legal or equitable title to real or personal property shall
be valid against a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without
notice thereof, . . . until such deed or mortgage is acknowledged or
proved according to law and lodged for record.
The preceding statutes, like the Arkansas Statutes, embody different
* Hereinafter Ky. Rev. Stat. will be referred to in the text as KRS.
7 In theory Arkansas accepts the title theory of mort ages, i.e., the mortgage
passes title to the mortgagee. Clearly, then, there could be no doubt that a
mortgage does affect title. Forman v. Holloway, 122 Ark. 841, 183 SW 763(1916); Walsh on Mortgages 27 (1984).
8 Note 6, supra.
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rules for deciding priority among mortgages. However, one dis-
similarity between the Arkansas and Kentucky statutes does exist:
KRS 382.280 contains the phrase, "bona fide deeds of trust or mort-
gages", while its Arkansas counterpart does not. The words "bona
fide" apparently limit the application of the statute to mortgages with-
out notice and for a valuable consideration. Such an interpretation
makes KRS 382.280 a "race-notice"9 statute since, not only must the
mortgagee be the first to record in order to prevail over prior mort-
gagees and deeds, but he must also be a purchaser for a valuable con-
sideration and be without notice.
In spite of the apparent conflict which exists in the Kentucky
recording acts, the courts have avoided any uncertainty in the law by
utterly ignoring KRS 382.280 and have applied KRS 382.270 (notice
statute) to mortgages as well as to deeds. 10 Nevertheless, as long as
this ignored statute remains on the books, there is danger that it will
be given consideration by the Court of Appeals in the future. This
possibility makes it necessary to understand the historical development
of these recording statutes.
The historical origin of KRS 382.270 is not difficult to trace since
the statute has undergone only a few changes from the time of its
enactment to the present. The development of "notice" rules in Ken-
tucky began within two early legislative acts. One act, passed in 1796
and based on a Virginia statute of 1748, controlled the recordation of
instruments other than mortgages until 1894. This 1796 statute clearly
established deeds as coming within the "notice" principles of con-
veyance recordations, for it states:"1
[N]o estate of inheritance or freehold, or for a term of more
than five years in lands or tenements, shall be conveyed from one to
another, unless the conveyance be declared by writing, sealed and
delivered, nor shall such conveyance be good against a purchaser for
a valuable consideration, not having notice thereof, or any creditor,
unless the same writing be acknowledged by the party or parties who
shall have sealed and delivered it.... and be lodged with the clerk
of such court to be there recorded.
9 Race notice means: A subsequent purchaser will prevail over a prior un-
recorded mortgage only if he records first and is a bona fide purchaser. For
example: A transfers property to B and B fails to record. A, subsequently, trans-fers the property to C who is without notice of B and C fails to record. B then
records. C records. The winner depends upon the type of recording statute.
Notice: C wins because he is a subsequent purchaser without notice. Race-Notice:
B wins because he records first and is without notice of other interests. Race: B
wins because he records first.
10Foesv. Moormnan and Hill, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 728, 86 SW 545 (1905);
Ratliff v. Sowards' Guardian, 152 Ky. 97, 153 SW 25 (1913'; Cox v. Guaranty
Bank and Trust Co., 199 Ky. 115, 250 SW 804 (1923); Hurley v. Hackney, 202
Ky. 452, 260 SW 16 (1924); Patton on Titles, sec. 8 (1938).
S111 Dig. Stat. Laws of Ky. 487 (Morehead and Brown 1834) (act passed in
1796).
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It should be noted that the preceding statute makes no mention of
the status to be given mortgages, but this situation was remedied by
the means of an 1820 statute which definitely placed mortgages within
the "notice" recordation category: 12
[N]o deed of mortgage or deed of trust hereafter made or
executed, for, or upon any real or personal estate, shall be good or
valid against a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice
thereof, or against any creditor, unless such deed shall within sixty
days after the acknowledgment or proof by two subscribing witnesses
according to the existing laws, be deposited for record in the office of
the county court clerk of the county where the estate therein con-
veyed or the greater part thereof lies.
As of 1820 the recordation picture was, as yet, uncomplicated, for one
statute (1796) dealt with deeds and the other (1820) dealt with
mortgages and both embodied the "notice" principle. This uncompli-
cated situation was not to remain, for in 1894 the word deed was in-
serted into the 1820 statute rendering that statute (now KRS 882.270)
into one covering both deeds and mortgages. 13 This, of course, made
the 1796 statute governing deeds superfluous and merely repetitive of
the law; nevertheless, it remains within the Kentucky Revised Statutes.
At present the Kentucky Statutes contain two acts which cover the
recordation of deeds but luckily they are not in conflict as are the two
statutes which cover the recordation of mortgages.
The historical background of KRS 382.280 is most difficult to trace
because the Court has ignored it for 120 years. Its progenitor was an
1837 statute. In order to understand this statute, it is necessary to
note the status of equitable interests in land before 1837. It was well
established by the 1830's that only legal interests in land need be re-
corded for the purpose of protection against a subsequent purchaser.14
The courts interpreted the recording statutes as not being applicable
to equitable interests such as second mortgages.', This resulted in a
purchaser being unable to ascertain existence of outstanding equities
when he bought property, since the holder of an equitable interest
would be protected against subsequent purchasers without recorda-
tion.16 The legislature, in 1837, sought to remedy this objectionable
situation by enacting the following statute: 17
12 Id. at 448 (act passed in 1820).
13 Gen. Stat. of Ky. sec. 496, p. 804 (Barbour and Carroll 1894).14Bank of Kentucky v. Vance's Adm'r, 14 Ky. 168, 174 (4 Litt. 1823);
Nelson's Heirs v. Boyce, 30 Ky. 401, 404 (7 J. J. Marsh. 1832); Averill v. Guthrie,
38 Ky. 82 (8 Dana 1839).
15 Bank of Kentucky v. Vance's Adm'r, 14 Ky. 168, 174 (4 Litt. 1823);
Nelson's Heirs v. Boyce, 30 Ky. 401, 404 (7 J. J. Marsh. 1882).
16 Ibid.
17II1 Dig. Stat. Laws of Ky. 148 (Loughborough 1842) (act passed in 1837).
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[F]rom and after the first day of July, eighteen hundred
and thirty seven, it shall be as necessary to record deeds of mortgage
or trust on equitable titles* on real or personal property, as though
the grantor had the legal estate; and all bona fide deeds of mortgage
and trust, shall secure the parties according to the terms thereof, in
the order of their execution.
* (Emphasis added)
This statute gives priority to mortgagees according to time of execu-
tion. The reason for inserting this last clause into the 1887 act is not
known; nor can it be explained with certainty why this statute uses
execution as the criterion for priority rather than actual recordation.
One possible explanation for the statute's peculiar wording is that the
word "execution" was inadvertently used instead of recordation. An-
other explanation would be that the statute's purpose was to give
priority to the conveyance which was recorded immediately after
execution. Whatever the explanation and purpose of this clause, the
1852 legislature attempted to remove its ambiguities. The 1852 Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes contained these changes: (1) The first clause
of the 1837 statute was dropped and the "notice" statute was changed
to apply to both legal and equitable interests;' 8 (2) The second clause
of the 1837 statute was enacted as a separate section of the Revised
Statutes (now KRS 382.280) and the word "execution" was replaced,
in effect, by the word "recordation"."9 It seems ironic that, as KRS
882.280 came into its present form, it at the same time lost its original
purpose of requiring equitable interests to be recorded-since now this
requirement was embodied in the "notice" statute.
The preceding discussion makes it apparent that the Kentucky
recording statutes are repetitive and contradictory in relation to deeds
and mortgages. Kentucky, unlike Arkansas, has ignored the statutes
which do not fit the general scheme of the Kentucky recording system.
KRS 382.280 was enacted approximately 120 years ago for a specific
purpose; this purpose ceased to exist after 15 years. The only possible
purpose that it can now serve is to cast doubt upon the present re-
cording law and at the same time cause fear that it may someday be
resurrected. It ought to be repealed. Luther House
PLEADING-INTEMaP=AnON OF RuLE 8.01, KENTUCKY RuLEs OF CivIL
PnOCIEDURE-CAUSE OF ACrbON REvrvED?-In a contract with the lessee
of certain coal mines, plaintiff acquired the right of hauling all coal
mined under the lease. Defendants subleased the mines, but they
18 Rev. Stat. of Ky., Ch. 24, sec. 11, p. 197 (Turner and Nicholas 1852).
19 Id., sec. 12, p. 198 (Turner and Nicholas 1852).
